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1 Introduction
A framework of real options has been commonplace in corporate nance. The last thirty years,
following the monumental works of Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel
(1986), have witnessed extensive debate and research on the investment decision of a rm based
on the techniques of option pricing. Many attempts have been made in the framework of real
options to broaden our horizons of understanding various issues in the real world. For instance,
a number of recent works emphasize the eect of business cycle on a rm's investment and
default decisions. Also, the problem of underinvestment and overinvestment induced by conicts
of interests has always been an essential issue to be investigated. Most research, however, has
examined those issues separately, and little is known about the interaction between them and
the joint determination of capital structure and investment decisions taking business cycle and
debt maturity into account.
In the present paper, we propose a model that gives us a comprehensive understanding of the
essential issues that need to be integrated; the optimal capital structure, investment triggers, and
default boundary are jointly determined, taking business cycle, debt maturity, and the volatility
of growth opportunities into account. The rm optimally switches between two diusion regimes
paying switching costs, and the cash ow generated from the rm depends on the state of the
economy, which switches via Markov chain. The optimal switching of diusion regimes can be
read as the rm's investment provided that the coecients of one regime dominate those of the
other. Furthermore, the model integrates the investment's reversibility by allowing negative costs
incurred when the rm switches from the regime with higher drift and volatility to that with
lower drift and volatility. It is natural that the triggers of investment, disinvestment, and default
depend on the state of the economy, and those events can occur not only by hitting the triggers
but also by exogenous change of the state of the economy. After illustrating the theoretical
framework, we present comparative statics regarding several parameters to articulate the eects
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of business cycle, the volatility of growth opportunities, and the debt maturity structure. The
results show that their eects are intimately linked with each other, which claries the necessity
of the integrated framework for these issues.
In terms of the inuence of debt structure, the optimal leverage ratio increases in the maturity
of debt consistently. Its eect on the investment timing, however, is sharply distinguished by the
risks that the growth opportunities involve. When the rm can raise the expected growth rate
without any incremental risks, the level of investment triggers is bimodal with respect to debt
maturity, peaking at each end, and is more sensitive when the investment is irreversible. This
result is consistent with Diamond and He (2014), and can be construed in the context of Myers
(1977); the well-known debt overhang problem. The author proposed to issue short-term debt
as a possible solution to mitigate the problem. Since the maturity of growth opportunities is
innity in our model in the sense that the rm can switch diusion regimes any time, shortening
debt maturity corresponds to any debt with nite maturity, and thus, the investment triggers get
lower as the debt maturity shortens to the moderate level. But the investment triggers rebound
as the maturity becomes very short, and this is because the optimal leverage ratio decreases
signicantly, leading the triggers to the level of those of an all-equity rm. The disparity in the
sensitivity depending on the reversibility of the investment is attributed to the fact that the
levered rm's incentive to invest is stronger when it is reversible so that the triggers increase
less even though the maturity gets longer.
The result is markedly dierent if the investment entails not only higher drift but also higher
volatility; the level of the investment triggers is unimodal with respect to the debt maturity,
and is more sensitive when the investment is reversible. This result can be read in the context of
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Equityholders usually have strong incentive to raise volatility at the
expense of debtholders. However, the portion of risks that equityholders should bear increases as
the debt maturity shortens to the moderate level, and thus the investment triggers rise. When
the debt maturity becomes very short, however, the triggers decrease again for the same reason
they increase in the previous case. The disparity of the sensitivity depending on the investment
reversibility is also ascribed to the fact that the levered rm's incentive to invest is stronger
when it is reversible.
In terms of the eects of macroeconomic condition, we present comparative statics regarding
the persistence of the business cycle, and the results also dier signicantly depending on the
volatility of growth opportunities and the debt maturity. The level of investment triggers gets
lower consistently as recession shortens because of the increase in expected cash ow. Still, more
comprehensive understanding is needed regarding its eect on the optimal leverage ratio and
yield spreads. When the investment only raises the expected growth rate, the leverage ratio
increases as recession shortens because no further risks are taken. The eect is more signicant
for the rm with short-maturity debt, which can be read with the perspective of the negative
sensitivity of the investment triggers with respect to the debt maturity. There is also dierence
in the eects on yield spreads. When the debt is issued with long maturity, the yield spreads are
more aected by the increase in expected cash ow than the increase in leverage ratio, which is
not signicant for the debt with long maturity, and thus the spreads decrease.
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However, the results are greatly changed if both expected growth rate and volatility increase
by the investment. The optimal leverage ratio does not increase signicantly, and it even sharply
decreases when the debt maturity is long enough and investment is reversible. This result can
be interpreted with the perspective of the positive sensitivity of investment triggers with respect
to the debt maturity. As recession shortens, the timing of investment is pushed earlier by the
increase in expected cash ow, which implies that the rm is more likely to be more volatile.
This issue is more signicant for the rms with longer debt maturity and reversible investment
opportunities because the incentive of overinvestment is stronger for them, and thus they lower
the leverage ratio. The yield spreads of the debt with long maturity are more aected by the
expected cash ow, and thus they decrease as recession shortens. But, the debt with short
maturity is more likely to be aected by the increase in leverage ratio, and so the yield spreads
tend to increase as recession shortens.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The setup of the theoretical framework
is presented in Section 2.1, and the benchmark model which includes business cycle but does
not involve the investment opportunities is briey introduced in Section 2.2. The main model
that incorporates both exogenous shocks from macroeconomic condition and the investment
opportunities is investigated in Section 2.3. The parameters adopted for the comparative statics
are introduced in Section 3.1, and the eects of the debt maturity and business cycle are analyzed
in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, respectively. The conclusion is given in Section 4,
2 The model and solutions
2.1 Setup
Suppose that a rm's asset value follows one-dimensional geometric Brownian motion, and that
there exist two diusion regimes in which the drift and diusion coecients dier. Then, the
dynamics of the asset value in each regime $i\in$ {H,L} can be described as follows:
$dX_{t}=\mu_{i}X_{t}dt+\sigma_{i}X_{t}dW_{t}, X_{0}=x$ , (2.1)
where $(W_{t})_{t\geq 0}$ is a standard Brownian motion dened on a ltered probability space $(\Omega,$ $\mathcal{F},$ $\mathbb{F}=$
$(\mathcal{F}_{t})_{t\geq 0},$ $\mathbb{P})$ satisfying the usual conditions. We postulate that the coecients of regime $H$ domi-
nate those of regime $L$ $($ i.e. $\mu_{H}\geq\mu_{L}$ and $\sigma_{H}\geq\sigma L)$ . All agents are assumed to be risk neutral,
and risk-free rate is given as a constant $r>\mu_{i}$ for $i\in$ {H,L} to ensure that the rm value is
nite.
Following Vath and Pham (2007), we suppose that the equity holders can switch the diusion
regime, which involves switching costs. From the dominance of coecients of diusion regimes,
we can regard switching from regime $L$ to $H$ as an investment in production facilities, which
usually incurs positive costs.2 Likewise, switching from regime $H$ to $L$ can be understood as a
switch of business eld that has fewer expected returns but is less volatile, which usually involves
2If it is nonpositive, the rm will invest instantly, which is a trivial case.
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a liquidation of a portion of facilities with negative costs.3
In developing the analysis of the rm's investment and default decision, the eect of the
business cycle on them should not be ignored. Hence, we introduce the state of the economy
denoted by $(\epsilon_{t})_{t\geq 0}$ . It is independent of $(W_{t})_{t\geq 0}$ , and its transition probability follows a Poisson
law such that it is a two-state Markov chain switching between states $B$ and $R$ , which refer to
boom and recession, respectively. Denoting the rate of leaving the state $k$ by $\lambda_{k}>0$ , there is a
probability $\lambda_{k}\Delta t$ that the economy leaves the state $k$ in an innitesimal time $\Delta t.$
Given the usual interpretation of business cycle, it is reasonable to suppose that the cash
ow, the investment costs, and the recovery rate depend on the business cycle. We suppose that
the rm with diusion regime $i$ in the state $k$ generates cash ow at the rate of $\delta_{ik}X_{t}$ where
$\delta_{ik}:=\delta_{i}\delta_{k}$ for $i\in$ {H,L} and $k\in$ {B,R}, and it is natural to assume that $\delta_{H}\geq\delta_{L}$ and $\delta_{B}\geq\delta_{R}.$
In terms of the switching costs, switching from regime $i$ to $j$ in the state $k$ incurs a constant cost
$\psi_{ik}$ . The switching costs can be negative, and $\psi_{ik}+\psi_{jk}>0$ must hold to prevent any redundant
switching.
Meanwhile, a rm can use debt nancing, and the capital structure is determined by the
trade-o between tax shields and bankruptcy costs. A constant tax rate is denoted by $\theta$ , and a
fraction $\gamma_{k}$ of asset value is lost when default occurs in the state $k\in$ {B,R}. It is also natural
to presume $\gamma_{B}\leq\gamma_{R}$ . Note that $\gamma_{k}$ needs to be interpreted in a broad sense; it incorporates
the huge losses accompanied with the default, such as the depreciation of the asset value, the
damage of reputation, and the deterioration of credit availability in a simple form. Following
Leland (1998) and Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), we adopt stationary debt structure
with nite maturity. Namely, the rm issues debt with principal $p$ , pays a coupon $c$ constantly,
and rolls over a fraction $m$ of the total debt. The average maturity of the debt is $1/m$ if the
bankruptcy is neglected, and the debt structure is completely characterized by a tuple $(c, m,p)$ .
As usual, it is assumed that the debt is issued at par and the coupon is chosen to maximize the
rm value.
2.2 The benchmark model
Before entering into the main analysis, it might be useful for us to briey introduce the case
that does not involve the optimal switching of diusion regimes as a benchmark model. That is,
the cash ow generated by the rm depends on the business cycle, but the rm does not have
the option of investing in production facilities. This corresponds to the case with $\psi_{Lk}=\infty$ and
$\psi_{Hk}\geq 0$ for $k\in$ {B,R}, and coincides with Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006).
An unlevered rm's value with diusion regime $i$ and initial state $k$ is as follows:
$\overline{U}_{ik}(x):=\mathbb{E}[\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}(1-\theta)\delta_{ik}X_{t}dt|\epsilon_{0}=k],$ $i\in$ {H,L}, $k\in$ {B,R}, (2.2)
where $X_{t}$ is the solution of (2.1). Since the state of the economy $(\epsilon_{t})_{t\geq 0}$ switches via a two-
state Markov chain, the rm value should satisfy the following system of ordinary dierential
$3It$ is obvious that the equity holders will never switch from regime $H$ to $L$ if it incurs positive costs, which
corresponds to the irreversible investment.
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equations (ODEs) for $x\in(0, \infty)$ and $i\in$ {H,L}:
$(r+\lambda_{B})\overline{U}_{iB}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{i}\overline{U}_{iB}(x)+(1-\theta)\delta_{iB}x+\lambda_{B}\overline{U}_{iR}(x)$ , (2.3)
$(r+\lambda_{R})\overline{U}_{iR}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{i}\overline{U}_{iR}(x)+(1-\theta)\delta_{iR}x+\lambda_{R}\overline{U}_{iB}(x)$ , (2.4)
where $\mathcal{L}_{i}$ is the generator of the diusion process in regime $i\in$ {H,L}. It is trivial to derive the
solutions of (2.3) and (2.4), and they can be found in the original paper, Jeon and Nishihara
(2014a).
The rm can use debt nancing for the sake of tax $shields_{\}}$ but it involves the bankruptcy
costs, and the default boundary is endogenously determined to maximize the interests of equity-
holders (e.g. Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996)). Taking cyclical cash ow into account, it
is reasonable to conjecture that the default boundary in recession is above that in boom, which
is veried from a numerical example in the following sections. Denoting the rm value and the
default boundary with diusion regime $i$ in the state $k$ by $\overline{V}_{ik}$ and $\overline{d}_{ik}$ , respectively, the following
system of ODEs should be satised for $x\in(\overline{d}_{iR}, \infty)$ and $i\in$ {H,L}:
$(r+\lambda_{B})\overline{V}_{iB}=\mathcal{L}_{i}\overline{V}_{iB}(x)+(1-\theta)\delta_{iB}x+\theta c+\lambda_{B}\overline{V}_{iR}(x)$ , (2.5)
$(r+\lambda_{R})\overline{V}_{iR}=\mathcal{L}_{i}\overline{V}_{iR}(x)+(1-\theta)\delta_{iR}x+\theta c+\lambda_{R}\overline{V}_{iB}(x)$ . (2.6)
For $x\in(d_{iB},$ $d_{l}$ and $i\in$ {H,L}, the rm in boom will default when the state switches to
recession by exogenous shocks, and the following ODE should hold:
$(r+\lambda_{B})\overline{V}_{iB}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{i}\overline{V}_{iB}(x)+(1-\theta)\delta_{iB^{X}}+\theta c+\lambda_{B}(1-\gamma_{R})\overline{U}_{iR}(x)$ . (2.7)
By the same argument, the following system of ODEs should hold for the debt value for $i\in$
{H,L}:
$(r+m+\lambda_{B})\overline{D}_{iB}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{i}\overline{D}_{iB}(x)+c+mp+\lambda_{B}\overline{D}_{iR}(x) , x\in(d_{iR}, \infty)$ , (2.8)
$(r+m+\lambda_{R})\overline{D}_{iR}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{i}\overline{D}_{iR}(x)+c+mp+\lambda_{R}\overline{D}_{iB}(x) , x\in(d_{iR}, \infty)$ , (2.9)
$(r+m+\lambda_{B})\overline{D}_{iB}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{i}\overline{D}_{iB}(x)+c+mp+\lambda_{B}(1-\gamma_{R})\overline{U}_{iR}(x) , x\in(d_{iB}, d_{iR}].$ (2.10)
The solutions of these equations can be found in the original paper, and we omit the derivation
for the same reason. Equity value is the rm value less the debt value in each regime and state
$($ i.e. $\overline{E}_{ik}(x)=\overline{V}_{ik}(x)-\overline{D}_{ik}(x)$ for $i\in$ {H,L} and $k\in\{B,R\})$ . The default boundary and the
coecients of option values are simultaneously determined by the smooth-t condition of equity
value and debt value at each trigger.
2.3 The main model
Having outlined the eects of the business cycle on the rm value, we shall now proceed to
analyze the rm that has options to invest and disinvest. That is, now we suppose that the rm
not only is aected by business cycle but also has options to switch the diusion regime, which
incurs switching costs.4 As noted earlier, equityholders have no incentive to switch from regime
$H$ to $L$ if it involves nonnegative costs, which corresponds to the case of irreversible investment,
4See Pham (2009) for the preliminaries of optimal switching of diusion regimes.
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and for a moment we assume that the investment is reversible $(i.e. \psi_{Hk}<0 for k\in\{B,R\})$ .
Before developing this argument regarding a levered rm, we shall briey introduce the case of
the all-equity rm.
An increasing sequence of stopping times $(\tau_{n})_{n\geq 1}$ with $\tau_{n}\in \mathcal{T}$ and $\tau_{n}arrow\infty$ represents the
decision when to switch, and $(\iota_{n})_{n\geq 1}$ with $\iota_{n}\in$ {H,L} denotes the regime at $\tau_{n}$ until $\tau_{n+1}$ . Also,
we dene $I_{t}^{i}$ $:= \sum_{n\geq 0}\iota_{n}1_{[\tau_{n},\tau_{n+1})}(t)$ with $I_{0}^{i_{-}}=i$ to trace the regime value that began from
initial regime $i$ . The process $(\epsilon_{t})_{t\geq 0}$ with $\epsilon_{0}=m$ is denoted by $\epsilon_{t}^{m}$ . Given these notations, the
value of an unlevered rm can be written as follows:
$U_{ik}(x) := \sup_{\tau_{n}\in \mathcal{T}}\mathbb{E}[\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}(1-\theta)\delta_{Ii\epsilon_{t}^{k}}X_{t}^{x,i}dt-\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}e^{-r\tau_{n}}\psi_{\iota_{n-1}\epsilon_{\tau_{n}}^{k}}]$ , (2.11)
where $X_{t}^{x,i}$ is the solution of the controlled diusion process
$dX_{t}=\mu(X_{t}, I_{t}^{i})dt+\sigma(X_{t)}I_{t}^{i})dW_{t}, t\geq 0, X_{0}=x$ . (2.12)
It is natural to guess that the triggers of investment and disinvestment depend on the state of
the economy, denoted by $s_{Lk}^{U}$ and $s_{Hk}^{U}$ for $k\in$ {B,R}, respectively. For a moment, we suppose
that only cash ow depends on the business cycle. That is, for the sake of simplicity, we assume
switching costs and recovery rate to be time-invariant. Given the cyclicality of cash ow, it is
obvious that $s_{iB}^{U}\leq s_{iR}^{U}$ holds for $i\in$ {H,L}. In other words, the investment is advanced and
disinvestment is delayed in boom in comparison with recession. Then, the value of all-equity
rm with diusion regime $L$ should satisfy the following system of ODEs for $x\in(O, s_{LB}^{U})$ :
$(r+\lambda_{B})U_{LB}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{L}U_{LB}(x)+(1-\theta)\delta_{LB}x+\lambda_{B}U_{LR}(x)$ , (2.13)
$(r+\lambda_{R})U_{LR}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{L}U_{LR}(x)+(1-\theta)\delta_{LR}x+\lambda_{R}U_{LB}(x)$ . (2.14)
If we dene $A:=U_{LB}-U_{LR}$ and $B:=\lambda_{R}U_{LB}+\lambda_{B}U_{LR}$ , they can be written as follows:
$(r+\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R})A(x)=\mathcal{L}_{L}A(x)+(1-\theta)(\delta_{LB}-\delta_{LR})x$ , (2.15)
$rB(x)=\mathcal{L}_{L}B(x)+(1-\theta)(\lambda_{R}\delta_{LB}+\lambda_{B}\delta_{LR})x$ , (2.16)
and it is straightforward to calculate the solutions, which can be found in the original paper.5
Given these solutions, the rm value of regime $L$ in $x\in(O, s_{LB}^{U})$ can be written as follows:
$U_{LB}=(\lambda_{B}A+B)/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R}) , U_{LR}=(B-\lambda_{R}A)/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R})$ . (2.17)
By the same argument, the rm of regime $H$ for $x\in(s_{HR}^{U}, \infty)$ can be obtained as follows:
$U_{HB}=(\lambda_{B}C+D)/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R}) , U_{HR}=(D-\lambda_{R}C)/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R})$ , (2.18)
where $C$ and $D$ are given in the original paper.
For $x\in[s_{LB}^{U}, s_{LR}^{U})$ , the rm of regime $L$ in recession will switch to regime $H$ when the state
of the economy changes to boom, and thus the following ODE should hold:
$(r+\lambda_{R})U_{LR}(X)=\mathcal{L}_{L}U_{LR}(X)+(1-\theta)\delta_{LR^{X}}+\lambda_{R}(U_{HB}(X)-\psi_{LB})$ $($2.19$)$
5The characteristic roots of ODEs are summarized in the original paper.
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A general solution of $(r+\lambda_{R})U_{LR}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{L}U_{LR}(x)$ is $E_{1}x^{\alpha_{R}^{+}}+E_{2}x^{\alpha_{\overline{R}}}$ , and if we nd a particular
solution of (2.19), the general solution of (2.19) will be the sum of them. Having the solution of
$U_{HB}$ in (2.18), we can guess that the particular solution is of the form $E_{3}x$ $E_{4}x$ $E_{5}x+E_{6},$
and a tedious algebra gives us the general solution as follows:
$U_{LR}(x)=E_{1}x^{\alpha_{R}^{+}}+E_{2}x^{\alpha_{\overline{R}}}+E_{3}x^{\beta_{BR}^{-}}+E_{4}x^{\beta^{-}}+E_{5}x+E_{6}$ (2.20)
where the specic form of the functions $E_{3},$ $E_{4},$ $E_{5}$ , and $E_{6}$ are given in the original paper.
Meanwhile, the rm of regime $H$ with the asset value of $x\in(s_{HB}^{U}, s_{HR}^{U}$ ] will switch to regime
$L$ , that is, liquidate a portion of its facilities, if the state of the economy changes to recession.
The same argument allows us to obtain the rm value as follows:
$U_{HB}(x)=F_{1}x^{\beta_{B}^{+}}+F_{2}x^{\beta_{B}^{-}}+F_{3}x^{\alpha_{BR}^{+}}+F_{4}x^{\alpha^{+}}+F_{5}x+F_{6}$ , (2.21)
where the specic form of the functions $F_{3},$ $F_{4},$ $F_{5}$ , and $F_{6}$ can be found in original paper.
In summary, the value of all-equity rm can be represented as follows:
$U_{LB}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}(\lambda_{B}A(x)+B(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R}) , x\in(0, s_{LB}^{U}) ,U_{HB}(x)-\psi_{LB}, x\in[s_{LB}^{U}, \infty) ,\end{array}$
$U_{LR}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}(B(x)-\lambda_{R}A(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R}) , x\in(0, s_{LB}^{U}) ,E_{1}x^{\alpha_{F\mathfrak{i}}^{+}}+E_{2}x^{\alpha_{\overline{R}}}+E_{3}x+E_{4_{\rangle}} x\in[s_{LB)}^{U}s_{LR}^{U}))U_{HR}(x)-\psi_{LR}, x\in[s_{LR\rangle}^{U}\infty))\end{array}$
$U_{HB}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}U_{LB}(x)-\psi_{HB}, x\in(0, s_{HB}^{U}],F_{1}x^{\beta_{B}^{+}}+F_{2}x^{\beta_{B^{-}}}+F_{3}x^{\alpha_{BR}^{+}}+F_{4}x^{\alpha^{+}}+F_{5}x+F_{6}, x\in(s_{HB}^{U}, s_{HR}^{U}],(\lambda_{B}C(x)+D(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R}) , x\in(s_{HR}^{U}, \infty) ,\end{array}$
$U_{HR}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}U_{LR}(x)-\psi_{HR}, x\in(0, s_{HR}^{U}],(D(x)-\lambda_{R}C(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R}) , x\in(s_{HR}^{U}, \infty) .\end{array}$
The constant coecients and the triggers are simultaneously determined by smooth-t con-
ditions at each trigger. Even if we allow cyclicality to switching costs and recovery rate, the
solution can be obtained by the same argument, except that the inequality regarding the level of
switching triggers might be changed. For brevity, the detailed illustration regarding those cases
is omitted here.
Having discussed the case of an all-equity rm so far, we shall now proceed to analyzing a
levered rm. Provided that the investment is reversible $(i.e. \psi_{Hk}<0 for k\in\{B,R\})$ , the default
occurs in regime $L$ only. The rationale behind this result is as follows: if disinvestment involves
negative costs, equityholders of the rm in regime $H$ will switch to regime $L$ right before the
default rather than default in regime $H$ , unless the covenant prohibits liquidating production
facilities.
Now we have triggers of investment, disinvestment, and default in each state $k$ , denoted by
$s_{Lk},$ $s_{Hk}$ , and $d_{Lk}$ , respectively, for $k\in$ {B,R}. If we only allow the cyclicality to the cash ow
for the sake of simplicity, as assumed in the previous analysis, we can conjecture that all triggers
are lower in boom than in recession because an upturn in the economy generates more cash
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ow, and this is veried by a numerical example in the following sections. It is natural that
the disinvestment triggers decrease as the reversibility of investment worsens (i.e. as $\psi_{Hk}(<0)$
increases for $k\in\{B,R\}$ ), and they can even be located below the default triggers. If this is the
case, the rm would switch to regime $L$ right before the default, but we assume for a moment
that the reversibility is high enough that we can have the following inequality for the level of
thresholds: $d_{LB}<d_{LR}<s_{HB}<s_{HR}<s_{LB}<s_{LR}.$
The technique used to calculate the rm value is similar to the case of the all-equity rm
except that the rm defaults. The rm value of diusion regimes $L$ and $H$ for $x\in(d_{LR}, s_{LR})$
and $x\in(s_{HB}, \infty)$ , respectively, can be obtained by the same argument used in (2.17), (2.18),
(2.19), and (2.21).
For $x\in(d_{LB}, d_{LR}]$ , the rm in boom will default if the state switches to recession, and the
following ODE should hold:
$(r+\lambda_{B})V_{LB}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{L}V_{LB}(x)+(1-\theta)\delta_{LB}x+\thetac+\lambda_{B}(1-\gamma_{R})U_{LR}(x)$ . (2.22)
A general solution of $(r+\lambda_{B})V_{LB}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{L}V_{LB}(x)$ is $L_{1}x^{\alpha_{B}^{+}}+L_{2}x^{\alpha_{B}}$ , and if we nd a particular
solution of (2.22), then the general solution of (2.22) is the sum of them. Having the all-equity
rm value in (2.17), we can calculate the solution as follows:
$V_{LR}(x)=L_{1}x^{\alpha_{R}^{+}}+L_{2}x^{\alpha_{\overline{R}}}+L_{3}x^{\beta_{BR}^{-}}+L_{4}x^{\beta^{-\fbox{Error::0x0000}}}+L_{5}x+L_{6}$ (2.23)
where the specic form of the functions $L_{3},$ $L_{4},$ $L_{5}$ , and $L_{6}$ are given in the original paper.
In summary, the value of a levered rm can be represented as follows:
$V_{LB}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}(1-\gamma_{B})U_{LB}(x) , x\in(0, d_{LB}],L_{1}x^{\alpha_{B}^{+}}+L_{2}x^{\alpha_{B}}+L_{3}x^{\alpha_{BR}^{+}}+L_{4}x^{\alpha^{+}}+L_{5}x+L_{6}, x\in(d_{LB},d_{LR}],(\lambda_{B}G(x)+H(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R}) , x\in(d_{LR}, s_{LB}) ,V_{HB}(x)-\psi_{LB}, x\in[s_{LB}, \infty)\end{array}$
$V_{LR}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}(1-\gamma_{R})U_{LR}(x) , x\in(0,d_{LR}])(H(x)-\lambda_{R}G(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R})) x\in(d_{LR}, s_{LB}) ,K_{1}x^{\alpha_{R}^{+}}+K_{2}x^{\alpha_{\overline{R}}}+K_{3}x^{\beta_{BR}^{-}}+K_{4}x^{\beta^{-}}+K_{5}x+K_{6}, x\in[s_{LB}, s_{LR}) ,V_{HR}(x)-\psi_{LR)} x\in[s_{LR}, \infty)\end{array}$
$V_{HB}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}V_{LB}(x)-\psi_{HB}, x\in(0, s_{HB}],M_{1}x^{\beta_{B}^{+}}+M_{2}x^{\beta_{B}^{-}}+M_{3}x^{\alpha_{BR}^{+}}+M_{4}x^{\alpha_{BR}}+M_{5}x^{\alpha^{+}}+M_{6}x^{\alpha^{-}}+M_{7}x+M_{8}, x\in(s_{HB}, s_{HR}],(\lambda_{B}I(x)+J(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R}) , x\in(s_{HR}, \infty) ,\end{array}$
$V_{HR}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}V_{LR}(x)-\psi_{HR}, x\in(0, s_{HR}])(J(x)-\lambda_{R}I(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R})) x\in(s_{HR}, \infty) .\end{array}$
The functional form of the coecients above can be found in the original paper.
Likewise, the debt value in each regime and state should satisfy the following system of
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ODEs:
$(r+m+\lambda_{B})D_{LB}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{L}D_{LB}(x)+c+mp+\lambda_{B}D_{LR}(x) ,x\in(d_{LR}, s_{LB})$ ,
$(r+m+\lambda_{R})D_{LR}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{L}D_{LR}(x)+c+mp+\lambda_{R}D_{LB}(x) ,x\in(d_{LR}, s_{LB})$ ,
$(r+m+\lambda_{B})D_{LB}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{L}D_{LB}(x)+c+mp+\lambda_{B}(1-\gamma_{R})U_{LR}(x) , x\in(d_{LB}, d_{LR}],$
$(r+m+\lambda_{R})D_{LR}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{L}D_{LR}(x)+c+mp+\lambda_{R}D_{HB}(x) ,x\in[\mathcal{S}_{LB}, s_{LR})$ ,
$(r+m+\lambda_{B})D_{HB}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{H}D_{HB}(x)+c+mp+\lambda_{B}D_{HR}(x) ,x\in(s_{HR}, \infty)$ ,
$(r+m+\lambda_{R})D_{HR}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{H}D_{HR}(x)+c+mp+\lambda_{R}D_{HB}(x) ,x\in(s_{HR_{\rangle}}\infty)$ ,
$(r+m+\lambda_{B})D_{HB}(x)=\mathcal{L}_{H}D_{HB}(x)+c+mp+\lambda_{B}D_{LR}(x) ,x\in(s_{HB}, s_{HR}].$
The solutions can be acquired in the same manner, and they can be summarized as follows:
$D_{LB}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}(1-\gamma_{B})U_{LB}(x) , x\in(0, d_{LB}],S_{1}x^{\alpha_{mB}^{+}}+S_{2}x^{\alpha_{\overline{m}B}}+S_{3}x^{\alpha_{BR}^{+}}+S_{4}x^{\alpha^{+}}+S_{5}x+S_{6}, x\in(d_{LB}, d_{LR}],(\lambda_{B}N(x)+O(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R}) , x\in(d_{LR}, s_{LB}],D_{HB}(x) , x\in(s_{LB)}\infty)\end{array}$
$D_{LR}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}(1-\gamma_{R})U_{LR}(x) , x\in(0, d_{LR}])(O(x)-\lambda_{R}N(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R}) , x\in(d_{LR}, s_{LB}],R_{1}x^{\alpha_{mR}^{+}}+R_{2}x^{\alpha_{\overline{m}R}}+R_{3}x^{\beta_{mBR}^{-}}+R_{4}x^{\beta_{m}^{-}}+R_{5}, x\in(s_{LB}, s_{LR}],D_{HR}(x) , x\in(s_{LR}, \infty) ,\end{array}$
$D_{HB}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}D_{LB}(x) , x\in(0, s_{HB}],T_{1}x^{\beta_{mB}^{+}}+T_{2}x^{\beta_{mB}^{-}}+T_{3}x^{\alpha_{mBR}^{+}}+T_{4}x^{\alpha_{\overline{m}BR}}+T_{5}x^{\alpha_{m}^{+}}+T_{6}x^{\alpha_{\overline{m}}}+T_{7}, x\in(s_{HB}, s_{HI\mathfrak{i}}],(\lambda_{B}P(x)+Q(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{f} x\in(s_{HR}, \infty) ,\end{array}$
$D_{HR}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}D_{LR}(x) , x\in(0, s_{HR}],(Q(x)-\lambda_{R}P(x))/(\lambda_{B}+\lambda_{R}) , x\in(s_{HR}, \infty) .\end{array}$
The functional form of the coecients above can be found in the original paper.
Equity value is the rm value less the debt value (i.e. $E_{ik}(x)=V_{ik}(x)-D_{ik}(x)$ for $i\in$ {H,L}
and $k\in\{B,R\})$ . The triggers and the coecients of option values are simultaneously determined
by the smooth-t conditions of equity value and debt value at each trigger.
The solutions can be obtained by the same argument even if we allow cyclicality to switching
costs and recovery rate except that the inequality regarding the level of triggers may be changed,
and the illustration for those cases is omitted to avoid unnecessary duplication.
As noted earlier, the rm will not switch back to regime $L$ if $\psi_{Hk}\geq 0$ for $k\in$ {B,R}, and
this corresponds to the case of irreversible investment. If the investment is indeed irreversible,
there are no disinvestment triggers, and the default can also occur in regime $H$ , but the default
boundaries of regime $H$ will be lower than those of regime L. The triggers of investment and
default are denoted by $\hat{s}_{Lk}$ and $\hat{d}_{ik}$ for each regime $i\in$ {H,L} and state $k\in$ {B,R}. The rm
value, debt value, and equity value are denoted by $\hat{V}_{ik},$ $\hat{D}_{ik}$ , and $\hat{E}_{ik}$ , respectively. Regarding an
unlevered rm, the investment trigger and the rm value are denoted by $\hat{s}_{Lk}^{U}$ and $\hat{U}_{ik}$ , respectively.




We adopt $r=0.08$ as a constant risk-free rate, which is close to the historical average Treasury
rates (e.g. Huang and Huang (2012)). For the diusion regimes, it is assumed that the coecients
of regime $H$ dominate those of regime $L$ , and we adopt $\mu_{L}=0.2$ and $\mu_{H}=0.3$ for the drift
coeents. Regarding the diusion coecients, we x $\sigma L=0.2$ and analyze with respect to
dierent volatilities of regime $H$ to clarify the individual features of growth opportunities, namely,
$\sigma H=0.2$ and $\sigma H=0.25$ . Compared with the former in which only the expected growth rate
grows, in the latter case, it is accompanied by the increase of risks.
For simplicity, we postulate that only cash ow diers depending on business cycle. That
is, switching costs and recovery rate are assumed to be time-invariant.6 Since it is natural that
more cash ow is generated in boom than in recession, we presume that $\delta_{B}=1.5$ and $\delta_{R}=1,$
having $\delta_{H}=\delta_{L}=0.06$ xed as Huang and Huang (2012) did.7 We adopt $\gamma_{B}=\gamma_{R}=0.4869$
for a fraction of loss at default to reect that the average recovery rate is 51.31% in Huang and
Huang (2012).
In terms of switching costs, we shall limit ourselves to investment with high reversibility,
namely $\psi_{LB}=\psi_{LR}=15$ and $\psi_{HB}=\psi_{HR}=-14$ , so that we can verify the inequality regarding
the level of thresholds assumed in the previous section (i.e. $d_{LB}<d_{LR}<SHB<SHR<SLB<$
$sLR)$ . If the reversibility of investment worsens, the disinvestment triggers can be located below
the default boundaries, which implies that the rm will disinvest right before the default. This
is the extreme case of the agency problem,8 which is not the main issue of the present paper,
and we shall focus on other aspects of the problem.
Following Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), we adopt $\lambda_{B}=0.1$ and $\lambda_{R}=0.15$ for the
persistence of the business cycle, and $m=0.2$ for the rate of rollover (i.e. 5 years of average debt
maturity). For the tax rate, we use $\theta=0.35$ as numerous works have done (e.g. Leland (1994),
Leland and Toft (1996)). Initial asset value is assumed to be $x_{0}=100.$
3.2 The debt maturity
In this subsection, we let $m$ (the rate of rollover) vary and examine the impact of debt maturity
on the optimal leverage and investment decisions of the rm. As noted earlier, the debt is issued
at par and the coupon is chosen to maximize the rm value.
First, we assume that the rm can raise the expected growth rate via growth opportunities
without any increase of volatility $(i.e. \sigma H=\sigma_{L}=0.2)$ .
$6$
Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) also assumed that the recovery rate is irrelevant to business cycle.
Refer to Elliott, Miao, and Yu (2009), Du and MacKay (2010), and Jeon and Nishihara (2014c) for the impact of
time-varying switching costs on the investment decisions of a rm.
7They assumed that the payout ratio is xed at 6% regardless of the credit ratings.
8See Jeon and Nishihara (2014b) for the detailed discussion regarding this problem.
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Figure 1: The optimal leverage ratio w.r. $t$ . debt maturity provided $\sigma H=\sigma_{L}=0.2$
Panel (a) of Figure 1 presents the rm's optimal leverage for dierent investment reversibility
provided that the rm is of regime $L$ and there is an upturn in the economy. We can see that
the optimal leverage increases in the debt maturity, which is in line with Leland and Toft
(1996), Leland (1998), and Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec $($ 2006 $)^{}$ The reason for this result is
delineated in Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) as follows: a reduction in the maturity of
the debt contract implies an increase in the debt service, which increases the default probability,
and thus the optimal response of the rm is to lower the leverage ratio. We can also notice
that the leverage ratio of the rm with reversible investment is lower than that of the rm with
irreversible investment. Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows the countercyclical leverage ratio, which is
consistent with Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) and Chen and Manso (2010).
(a) Reversible/Investment (b) Reversible/Disinvestment (c) Irreversible/Investment
Figure 2: The level of the triggers w.r. $t$ . debt maturity provided $\sigma_{H}=\sigma_{L}=0.2$
Figure 2 describes the investment triggers of the rm with reversible and irreversible invest-
ment opportunities. We can see that the triggers are bimodal with respect to the debt maturity,
peaking at each end, and more sensitive when the investment is irreversible. This result is con-
sistent with Diamond and He (2014), which elucidates the eects of debt maturity, and can be
construed in the context of Myers (1977): the underinvestment problem with risky debt nanc-
ing. Myers (1977) says that if debt matures after the expiration of the investment option, risky
debt nancing may induce the incentive of underinvestment because a portion of equityholders'
benets accrue to the debtholders in the form of reduction of the default probability; to mitigate
this problem, the author suggested shortening debt maturity.
9In Brennan and Schwartz (1978), the optimal leverage decreases as the maturity gets longer, but the default
boundary is exogenous in their model.
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In our model, the maturity of the options is innity in the sense that the rm can invest in
production facilities any time, and so shortening of debt maturity corresponds to any debt with
nite maturity. We can see in Figure 2 that the investment triggers get lower as the average
debt maturity shortens from innity to the moderate level. As the maturity becomes very short,
however, they rebound; and this result is intimately linked with Figure 1. As the debt maturity
shortens, the optimal leverage decreases signicantly (from 70% to 25% in the range of our
analysis), and thus the level of investment triggers converges to that of an unlevered rm as the
debt maturity becomes very short. It seems that this explication does not t very well if only the
reversible investment triggers are concerned. But, the tendency for the triggers to converge to
those of an all-equity rm is crystal clear in the disinvestment triggers and irreversible investment
triggers. The disparity of the degree of convergence and sensitivity is attributed to the fact that
the incentive of investment of a levered rm is stronger when it is reversible so that the triggers
increase less even though the maturity gets longer.
Now we shall proceed to the case in which the investment is accompanied by not only the
increase of expected growth rate but also the increase of volatility $($ i.e. $\sigma_{H}=0.25$ and $\sigma L=0.2)$ .
Figure 3: The optimal leverage ratio w.r. $t$ . debt maturity provided $\sigma_{H}=0.25>\sigma L=0.2$
We can see from Panel (a) of Figure 3 that the optimal leverage ratio also increases in debt
maturity regardless of the increase of risks via growth opportunities. Furthermore, the negative
correlation between the growth opportunities and leverage ratio is more signicant; the leverage
ratio of the rm with reversible investment is lower than that with irreversible investment and
even that with no real options.10 Note that the gap between them decreases as the maturity of
debt shortens. The countercyclicality of leverage ratio is also shown in Panel (b) of Figure 3,
and the gap between the optimal leverage ratio in each state widens as the volatility of growth
opportunity increases.
We also have similar results regarding the investment reversibility and the capital structure.
The leverage ratio with reversible investment is lower than that with the irreversible one, even
lower than the case with no investment. Yet, the rationale behind this result is dierent from
that in Figure 1. The investment raises not only the expected growth rate but also the volatility,
and this makes the equity holders with reversible investment opportunity advance the timing of
$1\fbox{Error::0x0000}$ has been examined in numerous works that there is negative correlation between leverage ratio and growth
opportunities (e.g. Mauer and Sarkar (2005) and Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005)).
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investment to earlier than those with irreversible one. This implies that the rm is more likely
to be volatile, leaving less room for raising the leverage ratio.11
$1\infty$
$\xi$
$1^{\vee-}t\infty--\cdot f_{\mu}\fbox{Error::0x0000}ae_{0^{\vee^{\backslash }}5}:i0(\cdot 1\mathfrak{d}\sim\cdot un..mt:_{m^{\mathfrak{N}}} \nu/\cdot\cdot u(i/n)0s\infty$
(a) Reversible/Investment (b) Reversible/Disinvestment (c) Irreversible/Investment
Figure 4: The level of the triggers w.r. $t$ . debt maturity provided $\sigma_{H}=0.25>\sigma_{L}=0.2$
Meanwhile, Figure 4 shows that the investment triggers are unimodal with respect to the
debt maturity and more sensitive when the investment is reversible, contrasting sharply with the
result from Figure 2. This result is directly linked to the overinvestment problem (e.g. Jensen
and Meckling (1976)). When the maturity of both the real options and the debt is innity,
equityholders have a strong incentive to raise volatility, because their expected prots increase
at the expense of debtholders. Yet, the portion of risks that equityholders should bear increases
as the debt maturity shortens, and thus the investment triggers increase. When the maturity
becomes very short, however, the triggers decrease again for the same reason they increase in
Figure 2; namely, the optimal leverage ratio decreases $signicantly_{\rangle}$ and thus the triggers tend
to converge to the level of those of an all-equity rm. The disparity of the convergence and
the sensitivity is also ascribed to the fact that the incentive of the investment of a levered
rm is stronger when it is reversible. This sharp contrast in the eects of growth opportunities
on investment timing is a novel result; this result is not presented in Diamond and He (2014)
because only the drift is controlled via the investment in their model.
3.3 The persistence of business cycle
In this subsection, we examine how the business cycle aects a rm's decisions to invest and
default. Having in the previous subsection discussed the signicant eects of debt maturity and
the volatility of growth opportunities on a rm's the optimal leverage ratio and investment
decision, we nd it natural to conjecture that there exist a disparity in the eects of the business
cycle which depends on them. Hence, we present the comparative statics of $\lambda_{k}$ with respect to
the dierent investment projects and debt maturity; namely, for $\sigma_{H}=0.2$ and $\sigma H=0.25$ , and for
$m=0.2$ (a bond with average maturity of 5 years) and $m=0$ (a consol bond), respectively.12
llThis rationale can also be conrmed by Figure 4 which presents the level of investment triggers, that is, the
incentive to invest. We can see that the gap between the leverage ratios of the two cases widens as the average
maturity of the debt lengthens so that the dierence between the investment timing of them increases.
12They are chosen to represent short and long maturity. When the maturity becomes very short (e.g. 6 months),
the yield spreads and the leverage ratio are very low, unsuitable for analyzing the eects, and so we adopt $m=0.2$
(5-year maturity on average) following Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006),
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Note that there is a probability $\lambda_{k}\Delta t$ that the economy leave the state $k$ in an innitesimal
time $\triangle t$ , and thus the state $k$ shortens as $\lambda_{k}$ increases for $k\in$ {B,R}. The same argument can
be obtained from the comparative statics of $\lambda_{B}$ and $\lambda_{R}$ , and for brevity we introduce only the
latter.
Figure 5: The various triggers, the optimal leverage ratio, and the yield spreads provided $\sigma H=$
$\sigma_{L}=0.2$ and $m=0.2$
Figure 6: The various triggers, the optimal leverage ratio, and the yield spreads provided $\sigma H=$
$\sigma_{L}=0.2$ and $m=0$
First, we supose that the rm can raise the expected growth rate without increasing risks
at all $(i.e. \sigma H=\sigma L=0.2)$ . Figures 5 and 6 correspond to the comparative statics of $\lambda_{R}$ with
$m=0.2$ and $m=0$ , respectively. It is assumed that the rm's asset value is of regime $L$ and
the economy is in an upturn. Above all, we can observe in Panel (a) of Figure 5 and 6 that the
investment gets earlier as $\lambda_{R}$ increases, and this is because the expected cash ow increases as
the recession shortens. Also, the gap between triggers of each state diminishes as the persistence
of the state shortens.
In terms of the optimal leverage ratio, we can see that it increases in $\lambda_{R}$ because the expected
cash ow increases without any incremental risks. It is more signicant for the rm with short-
maturity debt $(i.e. m=0.2)$ , and this can be read in the context of what we have examined
in the previous subsection: the negative sensitivity of investment triggers with respect to debt
maturity (provided that it is not very short) in Figure 2. The incentive of investment is stronger
when the debt is issued with short maturity, because the underinvestment problem noted in
Myers (1977) is mitigated.
The eects on yield spreads also dier depending on the debt structure. When the debt
is issued with long maturity, the yield spreads are more aected by the increase in expected
cash ow than the leverage ratio, which does not increase signicantly, and thus the yield
spreads decrease. But, the inuence of leverage ratio is more signicant when the debt is issued
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with short maturity, and thus the yield spreads tend to increase as recession shortens. With
irreversible investment, they sharply increase and then decrease gradually, and this result can
also be construed with what we have discussed in the previous subsection; the sensitivity of the
triggers is more evident when the investment is irreversible. Thus, the asset value is more likely
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Figure 7: The various triggers, the optimal leverage ratio, and the yield spreads provided $\sigma_{H}=$
$0.25>\sigma L=0.2$ and $m=0.2$
(a) The yield spreads
Figure 8: The various triggers, the optimal leverage ratio, and the yield spreads provided $\sigma_{H}=$
$0.25>\sigma_{L}=0.2$ and $m=0$
Now we shall proceed to the case in which the higher expected growth rate entails higher
volatility $($ i.e. $\sigma_{H}=0.25$ and $\sigma_{L}=0.2)$ . Figures 7 and 8 correspond to the comparative statics
of $\lambda_{R}$ with $m=0.2$ and $m=0$ , respectively. As observed earlier, the investment timing gets
advanced and the gap between triggers of each state decreases as $\lambda_{R}$ increases, but the other
issues make a sharp distiction from the former analysis.
The optimal leverage ratio tends to increase in $\lambda_{R}$ for most cases because of the increase
in the expected cash ow. It sharply decreases, however, for the rm with a consol bond and
reversible investment opportunities, and this can also be read in the context of the analysis
in the previous subsection: the negative sensitivity of investment triggers with respect to debt
maturity (provided that it is not very short) in Figure 4. As the expected cash ow increases,
the investment timing gets earlier; that is, the rm is more likely to be more volatile, and this
issue is more signicant for the rms with longer debt maturity and reversible investment oppor-
tunities because the incentive of overinvestment is stronger for them. Note that the sensitivity
of investment triggers is more signicant when the investment is reversible.
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The eects on yield spreads also dier depending on the maturity of debt. The yield spreads
decrease in $\lambda_{R}$ provided that the debt is issued with long maturity, and they are most signicant
when the investment is reversible. It is obvious for the case of reversible investment, because in
that case the leverage ratio sharply decreases and the expected cash ow increases. The yield
spreads also decrease in other two cases (i.e. the cases with irreversible investment and no real
options) because the eect of increase in expected cash ow is more signicant for the debt
with longer maturity and the increase of leverage is not signicant. However, this is not the case
when the debt is issued with short maturity. The debt value is less aected by the increase in
expected cash ow, and so the yield spreads increases if the investment is irreversible or if there
is no switching in diusion regime. When the investment is reversible, the yield spreads decrease
because the change in leverage ratio is less signicant and the rm can even switch back to the
regime with lower volatility.
4 Conclusion
We have proposed a model that incorporates the business cycle and the investment opportunities
of the rm. The state of the economy, which aects the rm's cash ow, switches via Markov
chain, and the rm can switch the diusion regime of asset value paying switching costs. The
triggers of investment, disinvestment, and default, which depend on the state of the economy,
are determined endogenously. Both the investment and default can occur not only by hitting
the triggers but also by exogenous change of the state of the economy.
The relation between investment timing and debt maturity is associated with the volatility
of investment opportunities. The level of investment triggers is bimodal with respect to the debt
maturity when the investment does not involve any incremental risks, peaking at each end, and
this result can be read in the context of the underinvestment problem noted in Myers (1977),
They are unimodal, however, with respect to the debt maturity when higher drift entails higher
volatility, which can be construed with the perspective of the overinvestment problem noted in
Jensen and Meckling (1976). The optimal leverage ratio is countercyclical in either case, but the
gap between the leverage ratio in each state is wider when the volatility of growth opportunity
is higher.
The eects of the persistence of the business cycle are also intimitely linked with the volatility
of investment opportunities and the debt maturity. As the recession shortens, the leverage ratio
tends to increase, which leads to higher yield spreads for the debt with short maturity; but the
yield spreads tend to decrease when the debt is issued with longer maturity, because the eect
of the increase in expected cash ow is more signicant for them. Furthermore, the degree of
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